



Do Excessive Wage Increases Raise Imports?  

















This paper uses a model of trade in vertically differentiated products to examine the 
effects of "excessive wage" increases (i.e. above productivity) on the volume of 
commodity imports. The model predicts that if the domestic country has comparative 
advantage in producing high quality varieties of some products, then  "excessive 
wage" increases may result in a decrease in the volume of imports for these products. 
The empirical validity of the model’s predictions is demonstrated with the use of 
disaggregated Japanese import data for the period 1967-95.  We also find that the 
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1.  Introduction 
 
According to the received wisdom in open-economy macroeconomics, the 
effects of an increase in a country￿s real wage - ceteris paribus ￿ on the volume of its 
imports are unambiguous.  Since wage costs are part of total production costs, the 
price of domestically produced goods will increase relative to the price of imported 
goods, thereby increasing domestic demand for foreign produced goods and the 
volume of imports.  This prediction of open economy macroeconomic models is the 
cornerstone of almost all applied trade balance analysis (see, for example, Hooper and 
Marquez (1995) and Krugman (1995)).  In the present paper we argue that this 
prediction is not generally valid.  To this effect we construct a model in which the 
volume of imports may not change (or even decline) in response to a rise in the real 
wage.  The empirical validity of our theoretical arguments is then demonstrated with 
the use of disaggregated Japanese import data for the period 1967-95. 
 
The standard specification of the import demand equation in macroeconomic 
models states that the (aggregate) volume of imports is positively related to aggregate 
income and positively related to the ratio of domestic to foreign  prices (see, for 
example, Goldstein and Khan (1985)). In accordance with the representative agent 
model, the standard specification can be thought of as arising as a result of a 
household￿s maximization of utility (which depends on the consumption of a   
￿domestic￿ and an ￿imported￿ good)  subject to a budget constraint. Implicitly, the 
predictions of the standard import demand equation are based on the assumption that 
the effects of changes in wages (and thus, prices) on the volume of imports arise for a 
given level of income.  In this paper we argue that once we abandon the assumption 
of a representative agent, and treat the ￿domestic￿ and ￿imported￿ goods  as different 
varieties of a vertically differentiated product, then increases in domestic wages -  2
even though they may result in increases in the (relative) price of domestic products 
and household incomes  -  may still cause a decline in the volume of imports.  
 
 The present paper follows Linder (1961) and assumes that household income 
determines the quality of goods demanded. In addition we assume that the goods, 
which the domestic country trades with the rest of the world (ROW), are vertically 
differentiated according to quality and that the domestic country has absolute 
advantage at all quality levels and comparative advantage (CA) at high quality 
varieties
1. In other words, we assume that the domestic country is technologically 
advanced. An increase ￿ ceteris paribus - in domestic wages will obviously reduce the 
range of qualities (varieties), which can be produced at lower cost by domestic 
producers.  This, of course, implies the orthodox conclusion that ￿ ceteris paribus ￿ 
the volume of domestic imports will increase.  But this is only half of the story 
because the increase in domestic wages (and hence ￿ as explained later - household 
incomes) induces domestic consumers to switch their demand to higher quality 
varieties; i.e. to varieties in which the domestic country has a CA.  It is thus possible 
that the latter effect largely offsets (or even overcomes) the traditionally expected one, 
so that the switch in demand to higher quality varieties results in no noticeable effect 
(or even a decline) in the volume of imports. 
 
  The theoretical possibility that increases in real wages may not lead to an 
increase in the volume of imports necessitates an empirical examination of the issue.  
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the ceteris paribus proviso on which the theoretical 
                                                         
1 There is a considerable body of evidence, which testifies to the importance of vertical intra-industry 
trade (see, for example, Schott (2001)). The evidence also suggests that vertical intra-industry trade is 
quantitatively more important than horizontal intra-industry trade. In addition, some studies (e.g. 
Grossman (1982), Muscatelli, Stevenson and Montagna (1995)) have attributed a significant role to 
vertical product differentiation regarding the size and interpretation of estimated price and income 
elasticities in international trade.  3
analysis is based should not be ignored.  If, for example, real wage increases did not 
keep pace with productivity increases, then nobody would be surprised to find a 
negative relationship between real wages and the volume of imports.  On the other 
hand, if real wages increased at a faster rate than productivity (i.e. real wage increases 
were ￿excessive￿), standard theory would predict a positive association between real 
wages and the volume of imports.  For this reason, in our empirical analysis, we 
enquire into the relationship between the volume of imports and (real) wages changes 
not accounted for by (or falling short of) productivity changes.  Our econometric 
findings based on annual data for Japanese imports of 68 commodity groups provide 
considerable support for our theoretical framework of a technologically advanced 
country.  We find that real wage changes not accounted for by productivity changes 
exert a (statistically) significant and positive influence on the volume of imports for 
only 28 of the commodity groups, whereas they exert a significantly negative 
influence for 10 of them, with the influence on the remaining 30 commodities being 
insignificant.  Having established the empirical relevance of our theoretical 
framework at a disaggregated level we proceed to enquire about its macroeconomic 
importance.  To this effect, we simulate for each commodity group the effects of a 
one-percentage-point increase in ￿excessive wages￿ on the volume of imports and 
then aggregate the responses.  We find that the aggregate volume of imports does not 
respond to changes in ￿excessive wages￿.  
 
  The outline for the remainder of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we set 
up our model of trade in vertically differentiated products and demonstrate how it is 
possible for a ￿ ceteris paribus ￿ increase in wages to results in a reduction in the 
volume of imports.  In Section 3 we use Japanese data to enquire into the empirical 
importance of our theoretical priors.  Our conclusions are then presented in Section 4.  4
2.  The Model and its Implications 
We construct the simplest possible model capable of illustrating the main idea 
of the paper.  Given that our objective is the study of the partial equilibrium effects of 
wage rate changes on the volume of imports (something akin to the import demand 
equation in macroeconomic models), we treat domestic (and ROW) nominal wages as 
exogenous. The model follows closely Malley and Moutos (2002) which has in turn 
borrowed from Rosen (1974) and Flam and Helpman (1987). 
 
2.1 Technology 
  We start by assuming that there are two goods produced in the domestic 
country: a homogeneous non-traded good and a quality-differentiated product that is 
traded with the ROW.  The ROW is also assumed to produce the differentiated 
product, albeit with a different technology.  The homogeneous good H is produced 
under perfectly competitive conditions in the domestic country, with the use of labour 
L, and imported intermediate inputs S (e.g. oil), which are produced in the ROW.  For 
the purpose of simplicity, we assume that the homogeneous good is produced with 
Leontief technology
2: 
{} HL S = min , ββ .         ( 1 )  
Perfect competition ensures that 
() / HS PW P β =+                                                          (2) 
where PH  is the price of the homogeneous good, W is the (domestic) wage rate, PS is 
the  domestic  price of the imported intermediate input and β  is a positive parameter. 
We assume that all prices in the domestic economy and in the ROW are expressed in 
a common currency (the exchange rate is assumed fixed at unity). 
                                                         
2 Schmid (1976) and Findlay and Rodriquez (1977) were the first to employ this assumption in open- 
economy macroeconomics.  5
  The quality-differentiated good is also produced under perfectly competitive 
conditions.  We assume that quality is measured by an index Q in the range [1, ∞ ], 
and that there is complete information regarding the quality index.  We further assume 
that in both the domestic country and the ROW costs depend on quality, and that each 
unit of a given quality is produced at constant cost.  That is, the production function 
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 where YQ denotes the number of units of quality Q produced in the domestic country 
and ε  and γ   are constant parameters.  The above equation implies that although costs 
per unit in terms of quantity are constant, costs may be increasing per unit of the 
quality index.  The latter assumption is motivated by the fact that increases in quality - 
for a given state of technological capability - involve the "sacrifice" of an increasing 
number of personnel. These workers must be allocated not only to the production of a 
higher number of features attached to each good (e.g. electric windows, air bags, ABS 
etc. in the case of automobiles) that directly absorb labour and intermediate inputs, 
but also to the development and refinement of these features.  According to equation 
(3), the price at which each unit of quality Q will be offered is equal to  
            () PQ Q W P S =+ γ
ε () .             (4) 
 
 
  The domestic country is assumed to have absolute advantage in the production 
of the quality-differentiated good, and this advantage becomes larger as the quality 
index increases.  This assumption can be captured by writing the production function 
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µµ        >  > 0 1 .   (5)  6
According to equation (5), the price at which each unit of quality Q, will be 
offered by ROW producers is equal to 
PQ QW P S
** () ( ) =+ δ
µ                                               (6) 
Under these circumstances it is obvious that only if domestic wages are higher than 
ROW wages, will the ROW be able to produce some varieties (qualities) at a lower 













 The  schedule  C(W0) represents the cost of producing different qualities of the 
differentiated good in the domestic country.  The position of the schedule obviously 
depends on domestic wages, which are initially assumed to be W0.  For the ROW, the 
corresponding schedule is CW
** ()  w i t h  WW
* < 0.  Under this particular structure of 
wages, the ROW will be offering all qualities up to QD,0 at a lower cost than the 
domestic country. We term QD,0 the "dividing" level of quality.  All varieties with 
quality larger than QD,0 will be offered by domestic producers.  From Figure 1 it is 
obvious that the domestic country can increase the range of varieties which it can  7
produce at lower cost than the ROW, if the wage rate is reduced to W1.  The new 
dividing level of quality is now QD,1.  This reduction in the range of varieties, which 
the ROW can provide at lower cost, is traditionally always expected to result in a 
reduction of domestic imports. 
 
2.2 Preferences 
  Households in both the domestic country and the ROW are assumed to have 
identical preferences, and to be endowed with one unit of labour, which they offer 
inelastically.  In this sense, changes in the real wage rate produce equi-proportional 
changes in household income and total compensation per employee.  There are, 
however, differences between households (both within and across regions) in the 
endowment of effective labour supply.  We assume that firms pay the same wage rate 
to all workers per effective unit of labour (thus costs are independent of the 
distribution of talent across firms). This implies that there will be differences in 
income across households, with households owning more effective units of labour  
earning more income than those with fewer units. We assume that there are only three 
income classes: the low income, the middle income and the high-income class.  Let 
Kl, Km, Kh signify the effective labour endowments of members in the low, middle and 
high-income class respectively.  Income of the three classes is then defined as El = 
KlW; Em = KmW;  Eh = KhW with Kl < Km < Kh.  
 
  Following Flam and Helpman (1987) we assume that the homogeneous good 
can be consumed in every desirable quantity, whereas the quality-differentiated 
product is indivisible and consumers can consume only one unit of it.  Households 
with income E (the subscripts have been dropped for convenience) choose the  8
consumption level of the homogeneous product and the quality level (variety) of the 
differentiated product to  
max ( , ) . . ( )          uHQ st PH PQ E H +=      (7) 
where H stands for the consumption of the homogeneous good, Q is the quality index 
of the differentiated good and P(Q) is the price at which quality Q can be bought 
under free trade.  We assume that for all households the solution to the above problem 
is such that the utility level that obtains from consuming both goods is higher than the 
utility that obtains from consuming only the homogeneous good.   
 
The free-trade price of each quality (variety) of the differentiated product will 
be equal to the lower cost of producing in the two regions: 
PQ Q W P Q W P SS () m i n { ( ) , ( ) } * =+ + γδ ε µ .        (8) 
Note that although the price of the homogeneous good remains constant no matter 
how much the household consumes of this good, the price ￿per unit of the quality 
index￿ (P(Q)/Q) which the consumer pays for the differentiated good is not constant. 
As can be seen from equation (8)  (see also Figure 1), P(Q)/Q  increases initially ￿ 
until it reaches the ￿dividing￿ quality level, then it drops as the cost of producing 
higher quality varieties is lower in the domestic country than in the ROW, and rises 
again as even higher quality varieties demand more than proportional increases in the 
use of labour and intermediate inputs. Nevertheless, the household knows the exact 
correspondence between quality and price, as both the domestic and the ROW firms 
are assumed to announce to households a price list linking quality to price according 
to equations (4) and (6). Equation (8) implies that the budget constraint has a kink at 
the "dividing" level of quality QD  (see Figure 1), i.e. the quality level at which the 
cost of production is the same in the domestic country and the ROW.    9
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In Figure 2, the budget constraint for a high-income household is shown as the 
curve  ADB.  P o i n t s  A and B  denote the maximum quantity and quality of the 
homogenous and the differentiated good, respectively, that a high-income household 
can buy
3.  The budget constraint has also a kink at point D ( which corresponds to the 
￿dividing￿ level of quality QD ).  It is then possible that there may be an income (say 
Em) such that the household is indifferent between buying the ROW produced quality 
Q0
* and the domestically produced quality Q0.  It is also clear that in this case that 
there will be no demand for qualities in the range (Q 0
*,Q0).  Further consideration of 
such a situation presents no new insights for the analysis that follows.  It is for this 
reason that we assume incomes of all classes to be such that consumers have a clear 
preference for either domestic or ROW varieties.  This is also demonstrated in Figure 
2, in which the low income household is shown to maximize its utility by consuming 
                                                         
3 The horizontal axis has been properly re-labeled to reflect the assumption that the differentiated good 
is not offered at qualities Q<1.  10
an imported variety (point b), whereas the high income household achieves it highest 
utility level by consuming a domestic produced variety (point a). 
 
2.3       Real Wages and Imports 
Given our interest in showing that wage increases may result in a reduction in 
the volume of imports, we concentrate on an initial equilibrium for which this is 
possible. It goes without saying that other specifications of the initial equilibrium can 
produce the standard result that wage increases result in an increase in the volume of 
imports. Nevertheless since our objective in this section is to establish the theoretical 
possibility that the standard result may not obtain, we  start by considering the case in 
which the domestically produced variety is consumed initially only by the high -
income households in the domestic country.  In Figures 3a-3c the initial equilibrium is 
displayed by the tangency of the budget constraints and the indifference curves at 
point 0.   
 
  Consider now an increase in domestic wages.  Given perfect competition, all 
income accruing to domestic households consists of wages.  This implies that the 
budget constraint moves outwards for all three-income groups.  This happens because 
the prices of both the homogeneous good and the quality differentiated good rise less 
than proportionately to the wage rate.  The assumption of an exogenous price for the 
imported intermediate input is thus crucial for connecting nominal wage increases to a 
rise in real income.  Along with the rise in domestic real income there is a decrease in   11
























the range of qualities (varieties) of the differentiated good that the domestic country 
can offer at a lower cost than the ROW.  In Figure 3a, the rise in domestic wages is 
associated with a shift of consumption for the low-income domestic households from 
lower to higher quality ROW   produced goods.  In Figure 3c, as in Figure 3a, the 
increase in domestic wages does not switch demand from goods (varieties) produced 
in one region to another.  It only leads domestic consumers to demand higher quality 
(domestically produced) varieties than before. 
 
In Figure 3b, the increase in domestic wages is associated with a switch in the 
consumption pattern of the middle-income domestic consumers.  The increase in their 
real income induces them to substitute higher quality domestically produced goods for 
the lower-quality ROW produced goods they were demanding before.  This switch 
will decrease the volume of domestic imports. 
 
We now use a particular functional form for the utility function in order to 
determine under what conditions middle-income households would achieve higher 
utility by switching from consuming ROW produced varieties to domestically 
produced varieties when domestic wages increase.  For simplicity, we assume that 
individuals have Cobb-Doublas preferences (i.e. 
1 ,1 UH Q
ααα
− =< ).  Given the non-
differentiability of the budget constraint when free trade is allowed, the household 
finds the combination of H and Q for which utility is maximized by comparing the 
utility levels it could achieve if it was forced to buy either only domestically produced 
or only ROW-produced varieties of the differentiated good (i.e. if P(Q) is equal to 
either  () S QW P
ε γ +  or to 
* () S QW P
µ δ + ). 
 
The demand functions resulting from the above optimization problems are  13
                                      ()
1/ (1 ) / (1 ( 1))( ) DS Qk W W P
ε αγ α ε =− + − +                           (9) 
                                     
1 /( ) ( 1( 1 ) ) DS Hk W W P αε β α ε
− =+ + −                                 (10) 
if the household is allowed to buy only domestically produced varieties.  On the other 
hand, if the household is allowed to buy only ROW-produced varieties, the demand 
functions are  
                                      ()
1/ * (1 ) / (1 ( 1))( ) RS Qk W W P
µ
αδ α µ =− + − +                       (11) 
                                     
1 /( ) ( 1(1 ) ) RS Hk W W P αµ β α µ
− =+ + − .                              (12) 
  As defined in Section 2.1.2, we assume that the household￿s income is 
proportional to wages, E=kW,  k>0. Note that in both cases the Engel curve is 
positively sloped everywhere, but despite the homotheticity of the utility function it is 
not a straight line. As incomes increase (i.e. a higher k) the Engel curve bends towards 
the vertical (H) axis. Nevertheless, expenditure shares remain independent of income. 
The indirect utility functions associated with the above demand functions are 
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                              (14) 
If  UD-UR>0, then the household achieves maximum utility by purchasing a 
domestically produced variety of the differentiated good.  Consider now the effect on 
UD-UR of changes in domestic wages, under the restriction that initially UD=UR.  We 
find that  
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 What equation (15) implies is that for a household whose 
initial income level (=kW) is such that UD is equal to UR, an increase in wages will 










 is a measure (around the initial dividing quality level) of the number 
of households (among those which had initially UD slightly smaller than UR) which 
will switch from ROW to domestically produced varieties (or vice versa). In this 
sense it makes clear that (marginal) changes in wage rates will not result in a switch in 
demand for households whose initial income level is such that the difference between 
UD and UR is large. A final implication of (15) is that if the domestic country has CA 
in low-quality varieties of the differentiated product ( ) ε µ > , then an increase in 
domestic wages will definitely result in a rise in imports.  
 
          The intuition behind this condition can be better appreciated if we conceptually 
divide the shift from point 0 to point 1 in Figure 3b into two separate effects.  The 
first effect relates to the traditional influence of wages on costs.  An increase in 
domestic wages makes the home country less competitive in the qualities (varieties) in 
which it were more competitive than the ROW and it contracts the range of qualities 
which the domestic country produces at a lower cost.  A measure that captures the 
amount by which the range of qualities contracts is ( )/ µ εε − , i.e. the proportional 
difference in the slopes of the average cost curves in the domestic country and in the 
ROW.  We term this the cost effect.  The second effect arises from the influence that 
wages have on household income and hence spending patterns.  An increase in the 
wage rate results in higher household income, and a switch of demand to higher 
quality varieties.  But, these are precisely the varieties in which the domestic country  15
has comparative advantage.  A measure that captures the influence of this effect is the 
ratio W/PS.  The smaller is W/PS, the larger is the increase in (real) household income 
resulting from a rise in wages since in this case non-wage costs are a smaller 
proportion of total costs.  This second effect has hitherto been ignored.  We term this 
the income effect.  The typical analysis of the effects of wage changes concentrates 
only on competitiveness (the cost effect), and it ignores the resulting switch in 




What Figures 3a-3c make clear is that, the volume of domestic imports may 
well decrease following an increase in domestic wages (incomes).  The precise effect 
will obviously depend on the size of the three income groups.  The larger the middle-
income group, the larger will be the expected decrease in domestic imports since this 
is the group for which the increase in real income may result in a switch from 
varieties produced in the ROW to domestically produced varieties
5.  The reason 
behind this unexpected result is that an increase in domestic wages even though it 
makes the home country less competitive, it induces domestic consumers to switch 
their demand to higher quality goods.  But these are precisely the goods in which the 
domestic country has a CA. This latter effect has hitherto been ignored.  The typical 
analysis of the effects of wage changes concentrates only on cost competitiveness, 
and it ignores the resulting switch in demand to varieties in which the domestic 
country has a CA. 
                                                         
4 The income effect identified in this paper must be distinguished from the traditional inclusion of an 
aggregate activity variable (GDP, for example) in import demand equations.  We discuss this issue 
further in Section 3. 
5 This, in effect, implies that income distribution is an important determinant of trade flows (see, for 
example, Gould (1994) and Marquez (2000)).  It also implies that as long as the distribution of income 
is not bimodal with little mass in the middle, the empirical importance of our mechanism will not 
necessarily be trivial.  In any case, the distribution of income in Japan (and almost all OECD countries) 
is not bimodal.  16
  It must, however, be noted that the effects on the ￿total volume￿ of imports of 
differentiated goods resulting from an increase in domestic wages is more 
complicated.  Notice (as shown in Figure 3a), that the low-income group still 
consumes varieties produced in the ROW after the increase in domestic wages.  But 
these imports are now of a higher quality than before.  In some sense, the ￿total 
volume￿ of imports by this group increases.  It is thus possible (even for the special 
case presented in Figure 3) that, despite the switch depicted in Figure 3b, the 
aggregate ￿volume￿ of imports responds in the traditional manner following a 
increase in domestic wages.   
 
It should be noted that, of course, there is no country in the world, which has 
CA in high quality varieties for all the commodities that it trades with the ROW.  In 
the case of commodities for which the domestic country￿s CA is in low quality 
varieties, our analysis predicts ￿ in common with standard theory ￿ that a ￿ ceteris 
paribus ￿ increase in domestic wages will result in an increase in the volume of 
imports.  Moreover countries trade not only in differentiated products, but in 
homogeneous goods as well.  For this reason we have chosen Japan as the country on 
which to conduct our empirical analysis, since Japan￿s international trade is probably 
the most technology (rather than natural resources) driven than any country in the 
world. In this respect it is also worth noting that Grossman (1982) has found that for 
many product categories the US produces varieties, which cover the whole quality 
spectrum, and as such US producers of a given product compete with imports 
originating from both developed and less-developed countries. Thus, the US ￿ 
although it is probably equally or more technologically sophisticated than Japan ￿ 
does not appear to specialize in the production of high-quality varieties.   
  17
3.  Empirical Implications and Evidence 
In this section we develop and test the main empirical implication of the 
theory developed in Section 2.  As explained, our model predicts that real wage 
changes have an ambiguous effect on the volume of imports.  Nevertheless, the ￿ 
ceteris paribus ￿ wage change assumed in our theoretical analysis surely finds no 
match in the data of any real economy.  The actual real wage data certainly reflect 
labour productivity changes, in which case costs may not rise is response to real wage 
increases.  For this reason we construct a variable that measures the amount by which 
real wage changes deviate from productivity changes.  We term this variable ￿excess 
wages￿ (w
e), and we obtain it from the residuals of a regression of the natural 
logarithm of real compensation per employee (w) on the natural logarithm of an index 
of productivity (p), i.e. 
* e ww ww p δ φ =− =−−                  (16) 
where w
* is the part of w directly attributable to productivity.  According to received 
wisdom, an increase in w
e is expected to increase the volume of imports.  
 
  In addition to the ￿excess wage￿ variable, we include two other ￿traditional￿ 
explanatory variables for the volume of imports in our econometric investigation: an 
aggregate activity variable and competitiveness
6.  The inclusion of an aggregate 
activity variable in our framework is essential for two reasons.  First, note that in our 
theoretical analysis labour is assumed to be the only domestically owned factor of 
production.  Nevertheless, since household consumption choices are made on the 
basis of total household income, rather than income derived from the sale of the 
household￿s labour services alone, care must be taken to control for the other sources 
                                                         
6 These two variables are standard ones used in the empirical literature on import demand.  See 
Goldstein and Khan (1985) for a thorough discussion of specification issues.  18
of income.  Second, the presence of not only final consumption goods but of 
intermediate inputs as well in the actual import data necessitates the inclusion of a 
variable measuring aggregate domestic activity.  We use domestic GDP to control for 
the influence of the above concerns.  Changes in the prices of imported goods 
(resulting from changes in exchange rates, foreign wages, foreign productivity, etc.) 
can also affect the ￿dividing￿ quality level and the volume of imports.  We control for 
these (independent of the behavior of domestic wages) changes in competitiveness by 
including the price of imported goods (expressed in domestic currency (i.e. yen)) in 
the econometric estimation.  Note that had we included the ratio of domestically 
produced to imported goods prices (i.e. the terms of trade) as an independent variable 
instead of just the prices of imported goods, the estimated coefficient of the 
￿excessive wages￿ variable would measure only (what we termed in the previous 
Section) the ￿income effect￿.  Since we want to investigate whether the ￿income￿ or 
the ￿cost￿ effects of ￿excessive wages￿ changes predominate, we control for only 
those changes in competitiveness, which are independent of the behavior of domestic 
wages.  Nevertheless, in order to provide an extra test of our theoretical priors we also 
report results based on a separate regression in which the ￿terms of trade￿ are 
included instead.  This issue is discussed further in the following pages. 
 
Our regression analysis is conducted with Japanese annual data from the 
period 1967-95 for sixty-eight commodity groups
7.  These data are obtained from the 
CHELEM (Harmonized Data for International Trade and the World Economy) and 
                                                         
7 A number of alternative univariate unit root tests are reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for all 68 
commodities as well as for all the conditioning variables (and when relevant their constituent parts).  
The preponderance of evidence resoundingly suggests that none of the logged levels data are 
distributed I(0).  While this finding might not accord with theoretical priors regarding the excess wage 
variable (as defined above) and competitiveness (i.e. the terms of trade), it is nonetheless a clear sample 
property of our data.  The implications of these findings will be discussed further below.  19
the OECD (Annual National Accounts and Economic Outlook) databases
8.  We begin 
by estimating the relationship between real commodity imports and the real ￿excess 
wage￿ per employee, controlling for aggregate income, import prices and 
deterministic trends, e.g.  
2 ;     ~ (0, );    cov( , ) 0 cov( , ),
e
i m w iid z α βγ εε σ ε ε =+ + + = = XD I X    (17)    
 
where mi is the vector of real imports for the i
th commodity (i=1,...,68); w
e is the 
excess wage vector
9,  X is a matrix of stochastic control variables [y, mp];  y is real 
GDP and mp is the yen price of imports; and D is a matrix of deterministic 
components containing a constant term and linear and quadratic trends.  Lower case 
letters for the variables denote natural logarithms. 
 
Since our main focus is to separately determine the effects of excess wages on 
the volume of imports once we have conditioned for aggregate income and import 
prices (and later competitiveness), we treat the above specification symmetrically and 
directly estimate the static representations using ordinary least squares (OLS)
10.  In 
other words, irrespective of statistical significance, the same set of conditioning 
variables as specified in (17) is maintained.  Given that we estimate 68x2 equations, 
this approach has the practical advantage of facilitating comparability across models 
and, as such, primarily constitutes an exercise in hypotheses testing.  This is in 
contrast to a specification strategy led by the desire to estimate the best fitting 
parsimonious model.  Furthermore, since our time-period is restricted to 1967-1995 
                                                         
8 Note that commodity #57 (electricity) reported in the Data Appendix is excluded from the analysis 
since it is not reported in CHELEM for Japan (see the Data Appendix for further details on variable 
definitions, sources and methods). 
9 Both Pudney (1982) and Pagan (1984) have shown that the two-step estimator of (17) is consistent as 
long as cov( , ) cov( , ) 0 z εε == X .  We will examine the validity of this assumption using the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test below. 
10 It is not possible to apply seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) here since the number of equations 
exceeds the number of observations.  However, even in the absence of this restriction, SUR would still 
be equivalent to OLS since we employ the same set of regressors in each equation.  20
and consistent with the univariate evidence reported above, we refrain from applying 
a long-run co-integrating, co-trending interpretation if the estimated models prove to 
be non-spurious.  We instead view any observed stationarity in the errors as simply 
reflecting the medium-term properties of the data over our available estimation 
period.   
 
Given the above arguments we will obviously not conduct extensive 
specification and misspecification testing.  Nonetheless, given our concentration on 
hypothesis testing, we would like to at least ensure that (17) is not spurious and 
further that our stochastic conditioning variables, i.e. the generated regressor, w
e, and 
the control variables y and mp, (and later competitiveness, c) are not correlated with 
the errors.  To address the former we apply a modified von Neumann type ratio test to 
the errors in specification (17).  For example, we test for stationarity of the errors 
using the Bhargava (1986) statistic, e.g.  
22
11 21 ￿￿ ￿￿ () / ( )
TT
tt t tt R εε εε − == =− − ∑∑                  (18) 
 
where  ￿ ε  is the equation residual. The statistic R1 is used to test the null of a simple 
random walk, (i.e.  ￿ , tt e ε ∆=  where,  11 ￿ e εµ =+,  t=2,￿T)  against the stationary 
alternative 1 ￿￿ () ( ) , ttt e εµ ε µ − −= −+ where 
21 / 2
11 ￿ [/ ( 1 )] e εµ ρ =+ − ,  t=2,￿,T,  01 ≤<  ρ ).  
Applying this test we find that the errors in virtually all commodity equations are 
stationary.  The exceptions include industries 20 and 36, i.e. watch & clock-making 
and vehicle   components   respectively.   These results are summarized in Figure 4, 
where the vertical axis represents the value of the R1 test statistic and the horizontal 
the sixty-eight commodity groups.  Finally, the horizontal line in Figure 4 is the exact 
limit at 5% for R1, N=29 (i.e. 0.814)
11. 
                                                         
11 This value is found by interpolation using Table 1 in Bhargava (op cit).  21












With respect to the issue of potential correlation between the conditioning 
variables and the errors we compare OLS, which is efficient (or more efficient) under 
the null but inconsistent under the alternative, with the IV estimator, which is 
consistent (and less efficient) under both hypotheses.  For example, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman (DWH) test (see Hausman (1978)) is calculated as follows:  
12 () ( ) () ~ ( ) IV IV IV OLS OLS OLS DW H bb bb k χ
− ′ =− − − SS ,             (19) 
where bOLS, bIV are the vectors of estimated parameters of OLS and IV respectively, 
,  IV OLS SS are the estimated variance covariance matrices of OLS and IV respectively 
and k refers to the degrees of freedom which are equal to the rank of () IV OLS − SS
12.   
Applying this test we find that in none of the 68 cases, do the OLS estimates 
significantly differ from the IV estimates. These results are summarized in Figure 5, 
where the vertical axis represents the value of the DWH test statistic and the 
horizontal the sixty-eight commodity groups.  Finally, the horizontal line in Figure 5 
is the critical value of the 
2 χ  distribution at k=6 (i.e. 12.59). 
                                                         
12 Note that the parameter vector b includes  ￿ α  and the ￿ β  and  ￿ γ  vectors.  Also note, in addition to all 
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Next we report a summary of the OLS parameter estimates of (17) in both 
Figure 6 and Table 1
13.  Figure 6 contains a frequency distribution for α  and for each 
element of the parameter vector β  (except for commodity groups 20,36 ￿ for which 
the errors were non-stationary) and 57 (for which no data are available).  As can be 
seen from Table 1, for the majority of commodity groups the estimates of the GDP 
coefficient and the import prices coefficient are consistent with standard theoretical 
priors.  In the case of GDP, for about seventy percent of the commodity groups (47 
out of 66) the coefficient is positive, whereas for the rest of the commodity groups the 
coefficient is (statistically) not different from zero.  In the case of import prices, for 
about sixty-two percent of the commodity groups (41 out of 66) the coefficient is 
negative, whereas there are 3 commodity groups for which the coefficient is positive.  
In contrast, for the majority of commodity groups (38 out of 66), the volume of 
imports is not positively affected by ￿excessive wages￿ (w
e).  The results in Appendix 
Table 3 show that for 10 groups the estimated value of  i α  is negative (and statistically 
significant) and for 28 groups it is positive (and statistically significant). 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Distributions of OLS Parameter Estimates 
￿ /
e
ii mwα ∂∂ =   1 ￿ / ii my β ∂∂ =   2 ￿ / ip i mmβ ∂∂=  
Mean                         1.053   
Median                      0.872 
Std. Dev.                   4.261 
#  significantly (+)         28 
% significantly (+)    0.424 
#  significantly (-)          10 
% significantly (-)     0.152 
Mean                         2.465 
Median                      2.516  
Std. Dev.                   1.476 
#  significantly (+)         47 
% significantly (+)    0.712 
#  significantly (-)            0 
% significantly (-)     0.000 
Mean                        -0.341 
Median                     -0.368 
Std. Dev.                   0.416 
#  significantly (+)           3 
% significantly (+)    0.045 
#  significantly (-)          41 
% significantly (-)     0.621 
 
 
According to our theoretical framework, a positive  ￿i α  implies that the ￿cost￿ 
effect dominates the ￿income￿ effect of  ￿excessive wages￿.  This will obviously be 
the case for homogenous products or for goods in which Japan￿s CA is in low quality 
varieties.  On the other hand, a negative  ￿i α  implies that the ￿income￿ effect 
dominates the ￿cost￿ effect, whereas for the remaining commodities the two effects 
appear to mostly cancel each other out.  
 
 As a further test of our theoretical framework, in Figure 7 and Tables 3 and 
Appendix Table 4 we show the results of allowing ￿excessive wages￿ to affect the 
volume of imports only through the ￿income￿ effect.  For this reason, we re- estimate 
the import volume equations for the 66 commodity groups
14.  In the new equations we 
                                                         
14 Applying the DWH revealed that in none of the 68 cases, do the OLS estimates significantly differ 
from the IV estimates. Moreover applying the stationarity tests to the residuals reveals that none of the 
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use the relative price of imported to domestic goods (i.e. competitiveness) to restrict 
w
e to affect the volume of imports only through the ￿income￿ effect.  We note through 
comparison of Tables 1 and 3 that the number of commodity groups with a negative 
￿i α  has increased to 15 (from 10), whereas the number of commodity groups with a 
positive  ￿i α  has decreased to 18 (from 28).  These changes are in agreement with our 
theoretical priors.  We expect that when only the ￿income￿ effect is allowed to 
operate the number of commodity groups with a positive  ￿i α  should decrease.  Indeed, 
our estimation reveals that the set of commodity groups with a positive  ￿i α  shrinks 
when only the ￿income￿ effect is operating, and ￿ more importantly ￿ it includes only 
these commodity groups for which  ￿i α  is positive when both (￿income￿ and ￿cost￿) 
effects are allowed to influence the volume of imports.  In the same vein, we expect 
that when only the ￿income￿ effect is allowed to operate, the number of commodity 
groups with a negative  ￿i α  will increase.  Comparison of Appendix Tables 3 and 4 
reveals this to be the case as well. Thus, we can have some confidence that our 
econometric specification captures the intended interactions.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Distributions of OLS Parameter Estimates 
￿ /
e
ii mwα ∂∂ =   1 ￿ / ii my β ∂∂ =   2 ￿ / ii mc β ∂∂ =  
Mean                        0.104 
Median                     -0.294 
Std. Dev.                   3.78 
#  significantly (+)         18 
% significantly (+)    0.265 
#  significantly (-)          15 
% significantly (-)     0.221 
Mean                         4.310 
Median                      4.573 
Std. Dev.                   2.759 
#  significantly (+)         58 
% significantly (+)   0.853 
#  significantly (-)            2 
% significantly (-)     0.029 
Mean                        -0.464 
Median                     -0.433 
Std. Dev.                   0.586 
#  significantly (+)           2 
% significantly (+)    0.029 
#  significantly (-)          39 
% significantly (-)     0.574 
 
 
Given the existence of large differences in the response of the volume of 
imports to ￿excessive wages￿ across the different commodity groups, a natural 
question to ask is what is the net effect at the aggregate level?  To answer this 
question we use the estimated equations for each commodity group to predict the 
effects of a one percentage-point increase in w
e on the volume of imports.  We then 
sum over the predicted change in the volume of imports for each commodity group. 
For example, we find that in response to a one percentage-point increase in w
e, the 
aggregate volume of imports is expected to increase by about one-hundredth of one 
percentage point. Additionally, this very small net response of the aggregate volume 
of imports is found to be not (statistically) different from zero.  The aggregate effects 





  In this paper we presented a model of trade in vertically differentiated 
products.  An important result emanating from the structure of this model is that a ￿ 
ceteris paribus ￿ increase in the wage rate of a technologically advanced country may 
not lead to an increase in the volume of its imports.  This prediction was supported by 
our analysis of Japanese imports of 66 commodity groups.  We found that not only 
there exist some commodities, for which the volume of imports is negatively  26
associated with domestic wages, but that the volume of aggregate imports does not 
respond to an increase in domestic wages. 
 
              Our findings also provide an explanation for the presumed difference in the 
income elasticity of imports between Japan and the US, first identified by Houthakker 
and Magee (1969). They found that the US income elasticity of imports exceeded one 
whereas the Japanese elasticity was smaller than one. If, as argued in section 2.3, 
Japan is more specialized than the US in the production of high quality varieties, then 
a ￿ ceteris paribus ￿ increase in per-capita and aggregate income is expected to result 
in a higher increase in imports for Japan than the US.  Our framework also implies 
that for technologically advanced countries, an increase in aggregate income, which is 
associated with an increase in population, and constant per-capita incomes will have a 
larger effect on aggregate imports than one with constant population and higher per-
capita incomes. This explanation must be considered as complementary to the one 
advanced by Marquez (2000) who argued that the relaxation of the representative 
agent assumption (an assumption which is rather untenable for the US given its large 
influx of immigrants) is part of the solution of the puzzle of the greater than unity 
income elasticity of US imports.     27
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6. Data  Appendix 
 
The trade data that we employ in this study is from the CHELEM (Harmonized Data 
for International Trade and the World Economy): Detailed Nomenclatures and 
Indicators database, July 1997.  This data has been collected from various 
international sources and has been harmonized by the CEPII (Centre D′ Études 
Prospectives Et D′ Informations Internationales, Paris).  The remaining data is from 
the OECD Statistical Compendium 1998(2). 
 
Variable Definition       S o u r c e  
C  Competitiveness,  1991=100     OECD  Economic  Outlook 
E     Nominal bilateral exchange rate with the dollar Yen/$   CHELEM 
Mi  Real imports,  () /
ii P MM N E M =⋅      transformation 
MNi  Nominal imports by commodity, $        CHELEM 
MP   Import price deflator, 1990=100        OECD Economic Outlook 
P  Index of Productivity, 1991=100        OECD Economic Outlook 
W  Real total compensation per employee, 1991=100     OECD Economic Outlook 
Y       Real GDP, 1990 prices           OECD National Accounts 
 
List of Goods in CHELEM 
1  Cement & derived products   36  Cars (inc. motorcycles) 
2  Ceramics (inc. manuf. Mineral articles)  37  Commercial vehicles & transport equip. 
3  Glass (flatware & hollow-ware)  38  Ships (inc. oil rigs) 
4  Iron & steel (inc. pig iron & sheet steel)  39  Aeronautics 
5  Tubes & first stage processing products  40  Basic inorganic chemicals 
6 Non-ferrous  metals  41  Fertilisers 
7  Yarns & fabrics  42  Basic organic chemicals 
8  Clothing (with fabrics as the main input)  43  Paints, colourings & inter. Chem. Products 
9  Knitwear (made directly from yarns)  44  Toilet products, soaps & perfumes 
10  Carpets & textile furnishings  45  Pharmaceuticals 
11  Leather furskins & footwear  46  Plastics, fibers & synthetic resins 
12  Articles in wood  47  Plastic articles 
13  Furniture (made of wood or other 
materials) 
48  Rubber articles (inc. tyres) 
14  Paper & pulp  49  Iron ores & scrap 
15  Printing & publications  50  Non-ferrous ores & scrap 
16  Toys, sports equip. & misc. manuf. 
Articles 
51 Unprocessed  minerals 
17  Large metallic structures  52  Coal (inc. lignite & other prim. energy) 
18  Miscellaneous hardware  53  Crude oil 
19  Engines, turbines & pumps  54  Natural gas (inc. all petroleum gases) 
20 Agricultural  equipment  55 Coke 
21  Machine tools  56  Refined petroleum products 
22  Construction & public works equipment  57  Electricity [not reported for Japan] 
23 Specialised  machines  58 Cereals 
24  Arms & weaponry  59  Other edible agricultural products 
25  Precision instruments  60  Non-edible agricultural products 
26  Watch & clockmaking  61  Cereal products 
27  Optics & photo- & cinema-graphic equip.  62  Fats (of vegetable or animal origin) 
28  Electronic components  63  Meat and fish 
29  Consumer electronics  64  Preserved meat & fish products 
30  Telecommunications equipment  65  Preserved fruit & vegetable products 
31  Computer equip. (inc. office equip.)  66  Sugar products (inc. chocolate) 
32  Domestic electrical appliances  67  Animal products 
33 Heavy  electrical  equip.  68 Beverages 
34  Electrical apparatus (inc. passive devices)  69  Manufactured tobaccos 
35 Vehicle  components      30
7. Results  Appendix 
 
Table 1: Univariate Unit Root Tests I 
      P-Values       
  Dependent Varibles       Dependent Variables   
  WS DF  PP      WS DF PP 
m1  0.99 0.62  0.84    m40  1.00 0.63 0.83 
m2  1.00 0.96  0.94    m41  0.99 0.87 0.83 
m3  1.00 0.98  0.92    m42  1.00 0.94 0.96 
m4  0.89 0.94  0.89    m43  0.96 0.83 0.85 
m5  0.99 0.94  0.94    m44  0.99 0.97 0.89 
m6  0.82 0.83  0.51    m45  1.00 0.94 0.86 
m7  0.97 0.22  0.44    m46  0.84 0.90 0.87 
m8  1.00 0.82  0.86    m47  1.00 0.84 0.87 
m9  1.00 0.77  0.86    m48  1.00 0.61 0.84 
m10  1.00 0.86  0.87    m49  0.74 0.82 0.82 
m11  1.00 0.73  0.88    m50  0.07 0.20 0.13 
m12  0.71 0.72  0.73    m51  0.57 0.40 0.33 
m13  1.00 0.52  0.84    m52  0.98  0.00  0.20 
m14  0.99 0.90  0.84    m53  0.86 0.07 0.45 
m15  0.98 0.98  0.85    m54  0.98  0.02  0.74 
m16  0.99 0.94  0.89    m55  0.36 0.57 0.30 
m17  0.99 0.94  0.95    m56  0.97 0.15 0.34 
m18  1.00 0.98  0.94    m58  0.34 0.51 0.24 
m19  1.00 0.99  0.99    m59  0.80 0.10 0.30 
m20  0.19 0.45  0.39    m60  0.10 0.25 0.11 
m21  0.34 0.59  0.43    m61  0.99 0.14 0.39 
m22  0.98 0.80  0.44    m62  0.76 0.83 0.57 
m23  0.93 0.82  0.68    m63  1.00 0.66 0.80 
m24  0.90 0.73  0.56    m64  1.00 0.64 0.81 
m25  1.00 0.98  0.95    m65  1.00 0.93 0.86 
m26  0.99 0.98  0.94    m66  0.51 0.72 0.73 
m27  1.00 0.98  0.88    m67  0.99 0.96 0.68 
m28  1.00 0.99  0.96    m68  1.00 0.57 0.81 
m29  1.00 0.99  1.00    m69  0.97 0.96 0.97 
m30  1.00 0.99  1.00           
m31  1.00 1.00  1.00     
Conditioning Variables 
m32  1.00 0.92  0.92    w  1.00 0.18 0.61 
m33  1.00 0.99  0.99    p  1.00 0.24 0.74 
m34  1.00 0.99  0.97    w
e  0.22 0.23 0.54 
m35  0.99 0.99  0.98    y  1.00 0.44 0.80 
m36  0.99 0.96  0.96    mp  0.75 0.35 0.54 
m37  0.97 0.84  0.86    c  0.33 0.59 0.37 
m38  0.09  0.00 0.05          
m39  0.86 0.61  0.42           
Notes: (i) WS, DF and PP stand for the Weighted Symmetric τ , Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests respectively; (ii) the above results include a constant term; (iii) a maximum of 
two augmenting lags was employed to represent the AR process generating the individual 
time-series; (iv) the AIC information criterion was used to choose the optimal lag length; (v) 
bold highlighting indicates significance at the 5% level of less (i.e. reject Ho: of a unit root). 
  31
Table 2: Univariate Unit Root Tests II 
      P-Values       
  Dependent Varibles       Dependent Variables   
  WS DF  PP      WS DF PP 
m1  0.37 0.24  0.51    m40  0.57 0.87 0.35 
m2  0.74 0.82  0.77    m41  0.53 0.71 0.61 
m3  0.68 0.71  0.62    m42  0.19 0.60 0.17 
m4  0.96 0.35  0.59    m43  0.68 0.81 0.80 
m5  0.47 0.47  0.71    m44  0.18 0.37 0.25 
m6  0.49 0.51  0.40    m45  0.50 0.49 0.55 
m7  0.29 0.15  0.37    m46  0.72 0.30 0.68 
m8  0.70 0.65  0.64    m47  0.11 0.29 0.22 
m9  0.58 0.47  0.59    m48  0.42 0.16 0.43 
m10  0.53 0.67  0.55    m49  0.19 0.01 0.36 
m11  0.47 0.32  0.53    m50  0.38 0.42 0.41 
m12  0.72 0.85  0.91    m51  0.47 0.57 0.64 
m13  0.83 0.15  0.64    m52  0.91  0.00  0.59 
m14  0.04  0.15 0.21    m53  0.94 0.41 0.92 
m15  0.88 0.93  0.86    m54  0.99 0.85 0.99 
m16  0.62 0.68  0.76    m55  0.76 0.79 0.69 
m17  0.67 0.78  0.67    m56  0.95 0.96 0.45 
m18  0.78 0.85  0.82    m58  0.68 0.13 0.43 
m19  0.93 0.96  0.97    m59  0.21 0.07 0.42 
m20  0.50 0.67  0.74    m60  0.45 0.58 0.40 
m21  0.65 0.72  0.81    m61  0.79 0.06 0.59 
m22  0.56 0.74  0.35    m62  0.84 0.93 0.67 
m23  0.54 0.70  0.78    m63  0.29 0.17 0.33 
m24  0.47 0.66  0.42    m64  0.47 0.20 0.42 
m25  0.73 0.70  0.73    m65  0.49 0.45 0.33 
m26  0.82 0.86  0.88    m66  0.80 0.46 0.63 
m27  0.95 0.91  0.69    m67  0.83 0.95 0.53 
m28  0.88 0.97  0.74    m68  0.76 0.17 0.65 
m29  0.88 0.89  0.96    m69  0.90 0.69 0.89 
m30  0.97 0.97  0.99           
m31  0.99 0.99  1.00     
Conditioning Variables 
m32  0.84 0.70  0.85    w  1.00 0.06 0.85 
m33  0.85 0.98  0.81    p  1.00 0.31 0.70 
m34  0.83 0.96  0.83    w
e  0.71 0.14 0.90 
m35  0.92 0.81  0.91    y  1.00 0.39 0.59 
m36  0.81 0.82  0.82    mp  0.92 0.93 0.96 
m37  0.20 0.36  0.38    c  0.02  0.09 0.25 
m38  0.17 0.08  0.17           
m39  0.22 0.41  0.38           
Notes: (i) WS, DF and PP stand for the Weighted Symmetric τ , Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-
Perron tests respectively; (ii) the above results include a constant and time-trend terms; (iii) a 
maximum of two augmenting lags was employed to represent the AR process generating the 
individual time-series; (iv) the AIC information criterion was used to choose the optimal lag 





Table 3: Detailed results for equation (17)  
Good 
Average  
M  i/M 
￿
i α  
T-stat. 
￿
i α  
1
￿




i β  
2
￿









2 R  
1  0.002  1.38 1.04 2.13 1.37 -1.23  -5.81  1.02 0.97
2  0.001  1.23 1.54 3.53 6.07 -0.37  -4.51  1.63 0.98
3  0.002  -1.55 -1.79 2.06 3.57 -0.42 -2.92  1.06 0.97
4  0.012 -10.01  -5.15 0.88 0.63 0.13 0.45  1.78 0.87
5  0.001  0.68 0.41 1.43 1.25 -0.62  -1.91  0.87 0.91
6  0.037  -3.14 -2.82 3.00 2.88 -0.12 -0.58  1.23 0.73
7  0.013  2.80 3.15 2.32 2.09 -0.82  -5.86  1.55 0.88
8  0.011  7.12 5.40 4.03 4.56 -0.49  -2.45  1.35 0.97
9  0.010  5.56 5.36 2.44 2.93 -1.03  -5.87  2.05 0.98
10  0.003  6.20 4.85 1.72 1.61 -0.78  -4.16  1.45 0.94
11  0.011  3.68 4.31 1.81 1.98 -0.65  -4.21  0.92 0.98
12  0.006  9.61 3.91 5.37 3.12 -1.18  -2.50  1.11 0.82
13  0.003  6.47 7.08 3.07 3.19 -0.58  -3.73  1.34 0.99
14  0.012  0.05 0.03 1.06 1.59 -0.23  -1.20  1.36 0.86
15  0.002  -0.10 -0.12 3.18 4.47 -0.36 -2.60  1.68 0.90
16  0.015  0.65 1.33 3.09 6.30 -0.78  -6.58  1.88 0.98
17  0.001  4.41 2.41 4.01 2.46 -0.12  -0.34  1.08 0.93
18  0.009  0.21 0.38 3.05 9.75 -0.26  -3.47  1.71 0.98
19  0.009  0.44 1.04 2.73 8.10 -0.17  -1.94  1.60 0.97
20  0.001  3.02 2.66 2.65 2.29 -0.86  -3.04  0.68 0.67
21  0.005  -7.16 -4.88 5.75 6.20 -0.01 -0.03  1.84 0.81
22  0.002  0.60 0.58 4.68 6.20 0.37 2.17  1.85 0.78
23  0.011  -1.53 -1.97 4.34 9.48 -0.48 -4.65  1.67 0.94
24  0.001  -17.64  -2.92 -0.89 -0.18 0.32  0.26  1.41  0.77
25  0.011  -0.60 -1.45 1.73 5.60 -0.45 -7.70  1.49 0.99
26  0.003  2.28 2.83 3.37 5.23 -0.54  -3.33  0.81 0.96
27  0.003  4.64 6.55 3.51 7.51 -0.28  -2.34  0.97 0.98
28  0.010  1.92 1.76 4.17 4.92 -0.22  -1.87  1.55 0.98
29  0.003  5.83 4.69 0.40 0.39 -0.94  -3.35  0.89 0.95
30  0.006  2.47 4.04 1.52 2.88 -0.58  -7.24  1.85 0.99
31  0.017  0.13 0.14 3.44 5.83 -0.43  -3.50  1.20 0.97
32  0.002  7.31 9.16 4.10 5.94 -0.70  -5.23  1.45 0.98
33  0.003  1.76 2.09 3.70 4.00 -0.03  -0.35  2.06 0.98
34  0.009  0.04 0.05 3.36 5.24 -0.22  -2.40  2.02 0.98
35  0.002  -0.50 -0.63 1.49 1.71 -0.56 -3.23  1.11 0.97
36  0.011  3.86 2.55 1.56 1.06 -1.30  -4.52  0.76 0.95
37  0.001  -4.59 -2.79 4.01 3.34 -0.45 -2.25  1.77 0.93
38  0.002  -2.65 -1.05 2.57 1.15 -0.12 -0.22  1.95 0.30
39  0.016  -5.09 -2.75 4.20 3.71 -0.32 -1.26  1.87 0.80
40  0.009  -3.01 -4.25 0.81 1.25 -0.23 -1.77  1.68 0.96
41  0.003  -0.57 -0.96 0.72 2.35 -0.30 -3.35  1.75 0.90
42  0.017  -1.18 -1.20 0.13 0.25 -0.30 -2.47  2.00 0.96
43  0.005  0.75 1.03 3.35 6.06 -0.57  -6.82  2.27 0.96
44  0.007  -1.74  -2.09 1.86 3.38 0.18 0.92  1.65 0.86
45  0.011  0.04 0.11 1.91 5.30 -0.49  -6.89  1.96 0.99
46  0.001  -5.25 -3.91 -1.25 -1.78 -0.45 -2.43  1.36  0.88 33
 
Table 3: continued 
Good 
Average  
M  i/M 
￿
i α  
T-stat. 
￿
i α  
1
￿




i β  
2
￿









2 R  
47  0.007  -0.12 -0.09 1.70 2.31 -0.46 -3.55  1.74 0.95
48  0.002  1.47 1.18 1.92 2.54 -0.49  -2.84  1.13 0.97
49  0.035  0.18 0.35 2.92 6.21 0.01 0.13  1.37 0.91
50  0.034  0.14 0.15 4.28 6.09 -0.04  -0.25  1.25 0.56
51  0.010  -0.21 -0.38 2.95 7.69 -0.17 -1.80  1.47 0.81
52  0.036  3.35 4.31 2.83 3.69 0.11 0.81  1.20 0.85
53  0.205  6.58 9.72 2.46 4.65 1.16 7.61  1.20 0.96
54  0.036  1.75 2.48 -0.67 -1.03 0.84 5.11  1.48 0.99
55  0.000  3.75 0.86 2.80 0.81 -0.14  -0.18  1.12 0.44
56  0.042  -0.76  -0.60 1.35 1.53 0.18 0.98  1.86 0.76
58  0.036  3.59 5.32 1.69 3.02 0.17 1.39  2.03 0.69
59  0.040  2.61 5.14 0.49 1.27 -0.51  -6.89  1.85 0.88
60  0.097  1.37 1.70 2.08 3.25 -0.50  -3.49  1.63 0.63
61  0.002 6.10  10.17  4.48  9.08  -0.35  -3.57 1.86  0.96
62  0.005  4.18 4.89 1.59 1.70 -0.17  -1.11  1.74 0.76
63  0.048  2.95 3.87 0.79 1.22 -0.89  -9.12  2.08 0.98
64  0.006  5.01 6.35 0.57 0.94 -0.93  -7.92  1.86 0.97
65  0.006  2.45 3.90 1.18 3.24 -0.56  -6.16  1.48 0.99
66  0.011  7.17 5.27 3.34 3.60 -0.11  -0.48  1.46 0.86
67  0.006  0.99 0.77 2.78 4.16 -0.48  -2.75  2.10 0.86
68  0.004  5.30 5.10 4.99 4.56 -0.34  -1.83  0.89 0.97
69  0.002  -0.24 -0.13 2.26 1.38 -0.94 -2.92  0.83 0.96
Notes: Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics. 
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Table 4: Detailed results for equation (17) using competitiveness instead of import prices 
Good 
Average  
M  i/M 
￿
i α  
T-stat. 
￿
i α  
1
￿




i β  
2
￿









2 R  
1  0.002  -3.10 -2.23 8.96 7.01 -1.75 -5.63  1.91 0.97
2  0.001  0.00 0.00 5.47  11.52  -0.46  -3.95  1.76 0.98
3  0.002  -3.04 -3.72 4.35 8.22 -0.57 -2.95  1.25 0.97
4  0.012  -10.39  -4.81 1.04 0.69 -0.29 -0.93  1.84 0.87
5  0.001  -1.54 -0.77 4.83 2.97 -0.86 -2.00  1.08 0.91
6  0.037  -4.05 -2.94 4.17 4.87 -0.43 -1.82  1.39 0.75
7  0.013  -0.23 -0.27 6.93 5.90 -1.19 -5.03  1.96 0.90
8  0.011  4.49 3.39 7.63 7.54 -1.17  -5.34  2.08 0.98
9  0.010  2.16 1.83 7.80  10.38  -1.26  -5.05  2.21 0.98
10  0.003  2.82 2.26 6.61 6.89 -1.41  -6.36  2.36 0.96
11  0.011  1.00 1.34 5.75 8.26 -1.10  -6.51  1.74 0.99
12  0.006 5.52  2.38  11.70  11.16  -1.56  -3.24 1.11  0.83
13  0.003  4.09 4.63 6.56 7.29 -0.97  -4.40  1.97 0.99
14  0.012  -1.12 -0.73 2.69 4.41 -0.51 -2.55  1.54 0.87
15  0.002  -1.17 -1.88 4.94 6.77 -0.38 -1.51  1.71 0.89
16  0.015  -1.12 -1.39 6.29 6.91 -0.51 -2.37  1.58 0.96
17  0.001  3.86 2.22 4.79 2.86 -0.24  -0.56  1.12 0.93
18  0.009  -0.59 -1.02 4.35 13.43 -0.29 -3.06  1.82  0.98
19  0.009  0.07 0.18 3.41 8.67 -0.10  -0.90  1.63 0.97
20  0.001  -0.03 -0.03 7.33 4.83 -1.17 -3.23  1.15 0.68
21  0.005  -7.29 -4.45 5.90 6.25 -0.07 -0.34  1.84 0.81
22  0.002  1.93 2.07 2.64 3.41 0.52 2.26  1.96 0.79
23  0.011  -2.92 -3.83 6.63 16.02 -0.49 -3.92  1.49  0.93
24  0.001  -15.50  -2.78 -3.67 -1.38 1.00  0.81  1.43  0.78
25  0.011  -1.70 -2.80 3.68 11.46 -0.34 -2.63  1.36  0.98
26  0.003  0.46 0.64 6.22 8.35 -0.68  -2.94  1.16 0.96
27  0.003  3.96 5.12 4.71  12.62  -0.21  -1.78  0.95 0.98
28  0.010  1.81 1.61 4.68 6.26 0.07 0.37  1.49 0.98
29  0.003  2.53 1.72 5.49 3.78 -1.27  -3.06  1.37 0.95
30  0.006  0.67 1.14 4.42 6.62 -0.65  -4.42  1.45 0.99
31  0.017  -0.69 -0.69 5.06 9.86 -0.19 -0.97  0.88 0.97
32  0.002  5.32 5.34 7.41  10.41  -0.69  -2.90  1.28 0.98
33  0.003  1.80 2.06 3.72 4.60 0.04 0.18  2.05 0.98
34  0.009  -0.36 -0.44 4.16 9.32 -0.09 -0.61  1.74 0.98
35  0.002  -1.59 -2.10 3.61 3.37 -0.27 -1.02  1.07 0.97
36  0.011  -0.66 -0.50 8.55 6.28 -1.74 -4.93  1.33 0.95
37  0.001  -5.97 -3.85 6.24 5.81 -0.50 -1.77  1.82 0.93
38  0.002  -2.61  -1.06 2.74 1.19 0.10 0.14  1.98 0.30
39  0.016  -5.21  -2.67 4.88 3.47 0.13 0.40  1.84 0.79
40  0.009  -3.47 -4.60 1.70 1.64 -0.12 -0.60  1.56 0.96
41  0.003  -1.35 -2.04 2.07 5.69 -0.25 -2.11  1.66 0.88
42  0.017  -2.28 -2.18 1.81 4.00 -0.43 -3.15  2.05 0.96
43  0.005  -0.93 -1.17 6.11 12.10 -0.59 -3.44  1.88  0.94
44  0.007  -1.35  -1.49 1.14 1.35 0.11 0.44  1.59 0.86
45  0.011  -1.09 -1.94 3.95 9.61 -0.34 -2.33  1.37 0.97
46  0.001  -6.82 -4.84 1.18 2.30 -0.61 -3.00  1.35 0.88 35
 
Table 4: continued 
Good 
Average  
M  i/M 
￿
i α  
T-stat. 
￿
i α  
1
￿




i β  
2
￿









2 R  
47  0.007  -1.99 -1.46 4.46 5.51 -0.76 -4.45  1.97 0.96
48  0.002  -0.78 -0.70 5.13 7.48 -0.96 -5.99  1.76 0.98
49  0.035  0.73 1.94 2.32 7.78 0.30 2.37  1.59 0.93
50  0.034  -0.47 -0.41 5.00 7.39 -0.31 -1.59  1.40 0.59
51  0.010  -0.62 -1.10 3.67 7.02 -0.13 -1.05  1.34 0.80
52  0.036  4.21 6.55 1.74 2.74 0.41 2.55  1.45 0.87
53  0.205  9.72 8.81 -2.86 -6.41 1.05 3.57  1.26 0.91
54  0.036  4.10 5.21 -4.60 -9.22 0.80 3.43  1.58 0.99
55  0.000  3.10 0.62 3.73 0.87 -0.28  -0.28  1.13 0.44
56  0.042  -0.51  -0.37 0.77 0.91 0.03 0.15  1.94 0.75
58  0.036  3.83 5.11 1.15 1.81 0.03 0.19  1.99 0.67
59  0.040  1.32 2.03 2.73 7.67 -0.40  -3.66  1.13 0.79
60  0.097  -0.52 -0.55 4.92 10.99 -0.75 -5.78  1.95  0.69
61  0.002  5.02 10.14 6.22 10.94 -0.39 -2.50  1.87 0.96
62  0.005  3.21 3.09 2.90 3.74 -0.43  -2.25  2.06 0.79
63  0.048  0.37 0.33 5.03 8.87 -0.90  -4.77  2.29 0.97
64  0.006  1.81 1.86 5.55  11.91  -1.22  -9.35  1.92 0.98
65  0.006  0.90 1.20 3.77 9.28 -0.52  -3.03  1.55 0.98
66  0.011  6.48 4.48 4.26 3.22 -0.32  -1.07  1.55 0.86
67  0.006  -0.79 -0.57 5.49 7.14 -0.70 -4.04  2.07 0.87
68  0.004  3.44 4.11 7.53 9.40 -0.84  -5.17  1.46 0.98
69  0.002  -3.24 -1.58 7.05 4.71 -1.10 -2.63  1.30 0.96
Notes: Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics. 
 
 